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ABSTRACT—For over sixty years, the Smith–Mundt Act prohibited the 
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) 
from disseminating government-produced programming within the United 
States over fears that these agencies would “propagandize” the American 
people. However, in 2013, Congress abolished the domestic dissemination 
ban, which has led to a heated debate about the role of the federal 
government in free public discourse. Although the 2013 repeal of the 
domestic dissemination ban promotes greater government transparency and 
may help counter anti-American sentiment at home, it also gives the federal 
government great power to covertly influence public opinion. To curb the 
potential harm of surreptitious government propaganda, while also 
preserving the benefits of repeal, this Note advocates for requiring the State 
Department and the BBG to clearly attribute any government-produced 
programming these agencies disseminate within the United States. This 
Note contends that attribution can be best accomplished in one of two 
ways: by passing new attribution legislation similar to that of the failed 
Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005 or by expanding the judicially created 
government speech doctrine to require these agencies to properly attribute 
any materials they distribute to the American public. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the United States spent over three-quarters of a billion dollars 
funding government agencies that produce and broadcast programming1 
around the globe.2 Yet, for over sixty years, all international broadcasts 
produced by the federal government could not be disseminated within the 
United States. A longstanding provision contained within the Information 
and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (commonly known as the Smith–
Mundt Act) prohibited the federal government from domestically 
disseminating any government-produced programming intended for a 
foreign audience, such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe 
broadcasts.3 That all changed when the ban was lifted on July 2, 2013, 
allowing the U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of 
 
1 In this Note, “programming” refers to all text, pictures, audio, and video intended for distribution 
to an audience. The terms “programming,” “broadcasts,” “materials,” and “content” are used 
interchangeably. 
2 BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 47 
(2012), available at http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2013/05/BBG-2012-Annual-Report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C45D-PCMF]. 
3 As explained in Part I of this Note infra, a de facto ban existed in the original Smith–Mundt Act 
that was passed in 1948. See 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. II 1948). A de jure ban was in place from 1972 to 
2013. See id. (Supp. II 1972); id. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012). From 1990 on, Americans could access 
government-produced materials that were over twelve years old. Id. (1994). Additionally, certain 
Americans could “examin[e]” government-produced programming in person at the State Department’s 
headquarters starting in 1948. Id. (Supp. II 1948).  
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Governors (BBG) to disseminate their programming to the American 
people with few restrictions.4 
The repeal of the domestic dissemination ban has generated an 
impassioned debate. Supporters laud the repeal because they believe it will 
promote government transparency, allowing Americans to monitor 
overseas government broadcasts5 and to study source material that was 
previously off limits.6 Others favor the repeal because they believe it will 
allow the State Department and the BBG to target émigrés with pro-
American programming in their native language, countering the foreign 
propaganda that freely streams into the United States.7 Those opposed 
believe that the repeal will compromise the independence of the press8 and 
allow the federal government to direct propaganda at its own people.9 More 
radical members of this group believe that the repeal is an ominous first 
 
4 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 Stat. 
1632, 1957–59 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012)). For the original text of the 
bill that was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, see H.R. 
5736, 112th Cong. (2012) (“Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012”). A predecessor to this bill was 
introduced on July 13, 2010. H.R. 5729, 111th Cong. (2010) (“The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 
2010”).  
5 See, e.g., Emily T. Metzgar, Public Diplomacy, Smith-Mundt and the American Public, 17 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 67, 99 (2012) (“Reform would make government evaluation of American public diplomacy 
efforts easier to measure and the increased visibility and transparency would lead to improved 
accountability to the taxpayers who fund the work.”); Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, The Smith-
Mundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to 
Public Diplomacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2006) (“The domestic dissemination ban may have 
outlived its usefulness and relevance. . . . [and] contradicts general U.S. policy promoting transparency 
and encouraging the free and open flow of information.”).  
6 See, e.g., Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 11; Charles F. Gormly, Note, The United States 
Information Agency Domestic Dissemination Ban: Arguments for Repeal, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 
191, 198 (1995). Others believe the ban was simply ineffective. See, e.g., Jeremy Berkowitz, Raising 
the Iron Curtain on Twitter: Why the United States Must Revise the Smith-Mundt Act to Improve Public 
Diplomacy, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269, 286–87 (2009); Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 29; 
Gormly, supra, at 202–04. 
7 See, e.g., NDAA 2013: Congress Approves Domestic Deceptive Propaganda, RT (May 22, 2012, 
5:03 PM), http://rt.com/usa/propaganda-us-smith-amendment-903/ [http://perma.cc/MV59-U4AW]; 
Thornberry and Smith Introduce Bill to Help Counter Threats in Information Age, U.S. CONGRESSMAN 
MAC THORNBERRY (May 15, 2012), http://thornberry.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=296108 [http://perma.cc/FNW7-QR8S]; infra note 160 and accompanying text.  
8 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Rep. Smith on His Controversial Bills, SALON (May 22, 2012, 11:05 
PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/22/rep_smith_on_his_controversial_bills [http://perma.cc/PHH2-
R9CH]; see also Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 11 (“In 1995, reports circulated within USIA that 
U.S. commercial TV and radio operators were lobbying to retain the [Smith–Mundt] Act restrictions on 
domestic information in order to limit news competition between government and private news 
agencies.”). 
9 Historically, Americans have had an “intense dislike of all sorts of government propaganda 
operations.” Burton Paulu, The Smith-Mundt Act: A Legislative History, 30 JOURNALISM Q. 300, 301 
(1953).  
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step toward a bleak Orwellian future in which the federal government 
dominates American media.10 
Fueling the debate is widespread misunderstanding about the repeal. 
The bill’s own sponsors, Representatives Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.) and 
Adam Smith (D-Wash.),11 have expressed differing views about the 
underlying purpose of their amending legislation.12 Adding to the confusion 
are inaccurate stories published shortly after the ban was officially 
repealed,13 as well as preexisting uncertainty about the federal 
government’s ability to disseminate government-produced programming 
within the United States.14 
As argued in this Note, the repeal of the domestic dissemination ban is 
both beneficial and detrimental. On the one hand, the repeal grants 
American citizens greater access to information about the federal 
government and bestows the federal government with greater flexibility to 
counter anti-American sentiment within the United States. However, the 
repeal changed too much too quickly. Despite broad support in the legal 
academy for a limited repeal,15 Congress stripped the Smith–Mundt Act of 
 
10 See, e.g., Mark LeVine, The High Price of ‘Dark Fusion,’ AL JAZEERA (June 4, 2012, 12:14 
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/20126294459762126.html [http://perma.cc/
8VY8-B4HW] (arguing that the repeal of the domestic dissemination ban is part of an “even darker 
Orwellianism” developing within the United States); Joe Wolverton, II, Congressmen Propose 
Domestic Distribution of Pro-U.S. Propaganda, NEW AM. (May 30, 2012), http://www.
thenewamerican.com/ usnews/congress/item/11560-congressmen-propose-domestic-distribution-of-pro-
us-propaganda [http://perma.cc/4ETB-E5CB] (“[C]itizens and residents will be exposed to government-
produced propaganda in a manner that would impress even Orwell’s Big Brother.”). 
11 H.R. 5736, 112th Cong. (2012). The Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 was incorporated 
into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 
Stat. 1632, 1957–59 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012)). 
12 Compare Thornberry, supra note 7 (stating that the amendment to the Smith–Mundt Act would 
primarily assist in combating domestic terrorism), with Greenwald, supra note 8 (stating that the 
amendment to the Smith–Mundt Act would primarily promote government transparency). 
13 See, e.g., Michael Hastings, Congressmen Seek to Lift Propaganda Ban, BUZZFEED (May 18, 
2012, 3:27 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mhastings/congressmen-seek-to-lift-propaganda-ban 
[http://perma.cc/5YN-6Y2C] (misstating that the repeal of the ban applied to all government agencies 
instead of just the State Department and the BBG); see also Juan Cole, Congress Wants the Department 
of Defense to Propagandize Americans, INFORMED COMMENT (May 20, 2012), http://www.juancole.
com/2012/05/congress-wants-the-department-of-defense-to-propagandize-americans.html [http://perma.
cc/Y3QP-YJAT] (mischaracterizing the Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 as legislation that 
applied to the Department of Defense). 
14 See Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy 
Corrections to Unverified Reporting, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 990–97 (2012); Metzgar, supra note 5, at 
67–68. 
15 Several academics advocated for repealing the domestic dissemination ban, but only if it were 
coupled with new limitations. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 6, at 307–08 (arguing for a complete 
overhaul of the government broadcasting bureaucracy and advocating for attribution of government-
produced programming because unattributed pieces “increase the amount of distrust between the 
government and its people”); Metzgar, supra note 5, at 96–97 (“Many concerns about potentially 
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all meaningful restrictions on the domestic dissemination of government-
produced programming,16 imparting the State Department and the BBG 
with enormous power to anonymously disseminate their programming 
within the United States. 
Rather than argue for or against the repeal of the domestic 
dissemination ban, this Note contends that government-produced 
programming disseminated within the United States should be clearly 
attributed. Unlike a blanket prohibition on the domestic dissemination of 
government-produced programming, which has proven difficult to 
enforce,17 attribution is straightforward and comparatively easy to 
implement. Moreover, attribution preserves the benefits of the repeal—
bolstering national security and fostering government transparency—
without allowing the federal government to covertly disseminate influential 
programming within the United States. 
This Note is divided into three Parts. Part I provides an overview of 
the legislative history of the Smith–Mundt Act from its passage in 1948 up 
through the repeal of the domestic dissemination ban in 2013. Part II 
analyzes the text of the 2013 legislation and other applicable laws and 
regulations. Finally, Part III argues for a legislatively imposed or a 
judicially imposed attribution requirement for all State Department- and 
BBG-produced programming disseminated within the United States. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SMITH–MUNDT ACT 
A. World War II–1953: Origins of the Smith–Mundt Act 
The Smith–Mundt Act traces its origins to World War II. In an effort 
to consolidate wartime propaganda efforts, President Franklin Roosevelt 
formed the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1942 by executive order.18 
The mission of the OWI was to counter Axis propaganda19 and to provide 
“information programs designed to facilitate the intelligent 
understanding . . . of the war policies, activities, and aims of the 
 
loosing Pentagon ‘psy-ops’ on the domestic American public with reform of [the Smith–Mundt Act] 
can be avoided by carefully defining the conditions under which the ban would no longer apply.”); 
Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 34 (arguing for a repeal of the ban on the conditions that government-
produced programming be subject to an attribution requirement and that limitations be imposed on the 
amount of government-produced programming disseminated domestically).  
16 See infra Part II. 
17 Berkowitz, supra note 6, at 286–87; Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 29; Gormly, supra note 6, 
at 202–04. 
18 Consolidating Certain War Information Functions into an Office of War Information, Exec. 
Order No. 9182, 7 Fed. Reg. 4468, 4468–69 (June 13, 1942). 
19 Id. at 4469. 
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Government.”20 The recently formed Voice of America (VOA), a 
government-funded news service, was incorporated into the OWI, and 
further expanded its broadcasts of pro-American news stories around the 
world.21 The OWI also conducted psychological warfare overseas, using 
radio and print publications to demoralize the enemy,22 and oversaw the 
Bureau of Motion Pictures, which collaborated with Hollywood to develop 
propaganda films.23 The pro-American Hollywood films were particularly 
important for bolstering support within the United States. OWI Director 
Elmer Davis once remarked, “The easiest way to inject a propaganda idea 
into most people’s minds is to let it go in through the medium of an 
entertainment picture when they do not realize that they are being 
propagandized.”24 However, as the outcome of the War became 
increasingly certain, the need for domestic propaganda waned. In 1945, as 
major combat operations came to an end, the OWI was terminated and its 
remaining broadcasting operations were transferred to the State 
Department.25 
Not long after the War, the federal government considered establishing 
a permanent government broadcasting agency. In October 1945, 
Representative Sol Bloom (D-N.Y.) introduced a bill that would have 
allowed the Secretary of State to more aggressively broadcast government-
produced programming internationally.26 But due to administrative delays 
 
20 See ALLAN M. WINKLER, THE POLITICS OF PROPAGANDA: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 
1942–1945, at 34 (1978). See generally History, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
http://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/history/ [http://perma.cc/39PV-BUYR] (providing a timeline of 
the development of government broadcasting).  
21 VOA History, INSIDE VOA (Nov. 26, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.insidevoa.com/section/
voa_history/2330.html [http://perma.cc/PE4R-GEGU] (providing a timeline of the development of 
VOA). By the end of the war, VOA was broadcasting in forty languages. WILSON P. DIZARD JR., 
INVENTING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE STORY OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY 25 (2004). VOA is 
currently the largest broadcasting service in the United States. See Voice of America, BROADCASTING 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/voa/ [http://perma.cc/CB7H-WWH3]. It is 
now under the supervision of the BBG. Id.  
22 WINKLER, supra note 20, at 113, 115, 117–19, 142. One of the most fascinating pieces of World 
War II-era propaganda is a novel written by Nobel Prize-winning author John Steinbeck about a small 
town invaded by a foreign army. JOHN STEINBECK, THE MOON IS DOWN (1942). 
23 CLAYTON R. KOPPES & GREGORY D. BLACK, HOLLYWOOD GOES TO WAR: HOW POLITICS, 
PROFITS, AND PROPAGANDA SHAPED WORLD WAR II MOVIES 59 (1987).  
24 Id. at 64.  
25 HARRY S. TRUMAN, Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Concerning Government 
Information Programs (Aug. 31 1945), in OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REG., PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1945, at 252–53 (1961). After the war, VOA 
was reduced significantly: two-thirds of its broadcasting staff were let go, and the number of languages 
broadcast was cut in half. VOA in the Postwar Years, INSIDE VOA (Feb. 13, 2007, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.insidevoa.com/content/a-13-34-2007-post-wwii-history-111602679/177529.html [http://
perma.cc/N5TW-TVKK].  
26 See Paulu, supra note 9, at 301. 
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and legislative bickering, the “Bloom Bill” died one year after it was 
introduced.27 However, the idea of a peacetime government broadcasting 
agency lived on.28 In the months that followed the demise of the Bloom 
Bill, Democrats and Republicans continued to spar over whether to 
establish a permanent government broadcasting agency that would be 
operational during wartime and peacetime alike.29 
Striking the right balance between government broadcasting and 
private broadcasting proved difficult. A number of Republican 
congressmen opposed a government-funded broadcasting agency over 
concerns that government-produced programming would supplant, rather 
than supplement, privately produced programming.30 As a compromise, a 
few representatives suggested that a future bill require the State 
Department to rely primarily on privately produced programming for its 
broadcasts.31 Some even favored turning “the whole [State Department 
broadcasting] operation over to NBC and CBS,”32 but this was never done. 
Ultimately, the suggestion of requiring the State Department to employ 
private broadcasters assuaged Republican concerns about government 
interference in the private sector, and also addressed budgetary concerns; 
privately produced programming was believed to be less costly and higher 
quality than State Department-produced programming.33 
Several months after the failed Bloom Bill, Congress began drafting 
legislation to establish a permanent government broadcasting agency that 
would not encroach on the efforts of private broadcasters. In May 1947, 
Representative Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.) introduced such a bill, which was 
entitled the “Information and Educational Exchange Act.”34 The Mundt 
Bill, as it was more commonly known, drew many of its provisions from 
the failed Bloom Bill.35 According to Representative Mundt, the bill was an 
anti-Soviet measure designed to “give legislative authority for our Voice of 
America short-wave program and also set up a broad over-all program to 
tell the truth about America in the areas of the world where we are today 
 
27 Id. at 302. 
28 Despite the legislative tumult, VOA broadcasts persisted, buoyed by temporary funding provided 
by the Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1947. Id.  
29 Id. at 302–03. Concern about government–industry relationships in the broadcasting sector 
persists to this day. See Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 11. 
30 Paulu, supra note 9, at 303. 
31 Id. at 308. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 H.R. 3342, 80th Cong. (1947). 
35 Id.; Paulu, supra note 9, at 308–09. 
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being misinterpreted abroad by the voices coming from the Moscow 
headquarters of Red fascism.”36 
Although the Mundt Bill was introduced as a means to counteract 
communist propaganda, some representatives opposed the bill on the 
grounds that handing over international government broadcasting to the 
“leftists” in the State Department would actually increase the amount of 
communist propaganda worldwide.37 Other representatives opposed the 
Mundt Bill simply because they believed the State Department would 
administer international broadcasting ineptly.38 
Debate over the Mundt Bill was heated.39 At one point during the 
deliberations, Representative Mundt bemoaned, “Never since I have been 
in Congress have I heard such a disorganized collection of misinformation 
circulated about any one piece of legislation as about this legislation.”40 
Yet, despite vocal opposition throughout the drafting process, the bill easily 
passed the House41 and Senate.42 In early 1948, President Harry Truman 
signed into law the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948—
or, as it was more commonly known, the Smith–Mundt Act.43 
Initially, the State Department was given full responsibility for 
administering the provisions of the Smith–Mundt Act.44 The State 
Department continued to broadcast VOA programming and began 
disseminating companion news bulletins and motion pictures.45 In 1953, 
President Dwight Eisenhower established a new government agency, the 
United States Information Agency (USIA), to coordinate the federal 
government’s international broadcasting and educational exchange 
 
36 93 CONG. REC. 4638 (1947).  
37 See Paulu, supra note 9, at 310–11.  
38 Id. at 310. 
39 Id. at 311. Debate over the bill spanned six days. Id.  
40 93 CONG. REC. 6754.  
41 Id. at 7617. The bill passed the House by a vote of 273–97. Paulu, supra note 9, at 312. Of those 
who voted for the bill, 121 were Republicans, 151 were Democrats, and 1 was an American Laborite. 
Id. 
42 The bill passed the Senate by a unanimous vote. Paulu, supra note 9, at 314. Before passage in 
the Senate, the bill was amended slightly by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Id. at 313. The 
most notable change was the separation of broadcasting services from educational exchange services. 
Id.  
43 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II 1948); Pub. L. No. 80-402, § 2, 62 Stat. 6 (1948). The Smith–Mundt 
Act was named after its cosponsors Representative Mundt and Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-N.J.). 
Paulu, supra note 9, at 300 n.1.  
44 22 U.S.C. § 1461. 
45 Paulu, supra note 9, at 300. Although the State Department was permitted to create and 
broadcast its own materials, it was required “to utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, the services 
and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion picture, 
and other agencies, through contractual arrangements or otherwise.” § 1437. 
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services.46 The USIA was created specifically to “lead to substantial 
economies and significantly improved effectiveness of administration” for 
countering anti-American propaganda abroad.47 
1. The De Facto Dissemination Ban.—There is no doubt that the 
Smith–Mundt Act permitted the federal government to disseminate its 
message abroad, but it is less certain whether it prohibited the federal 
government from disseminating its message within the United States. Some 
have argued that the original version of the Smith–Mundt Act permitted 
domestic dissemination because it did not contain an explicit prohibition on 
the domestic dissemination of government-produced programming, and 
because it allowed certain members of the American public to access these 
otherwise off-limits materials at specified government agencies.48 However, 
a more plausible reading is that a de facto ban existed. Although there was 
no explicit ban on the domestic dissemination of government-produced 
programming in the original Smith–Mundt Act, there were clear 
restrictions on who could view them; government-produced programming 
could only be “examin[ed]” by “representatives of United States press 
associations” and could only be “made available” to members of 
Congress.49 Such strict constraints on accessing these materials strongly 
suggest that Congress did not want this information to be widely distributed 
to the American public. 
Moreover, many Congressional members did not trust the State 
Department because they believed it contained numerous communist 
sympathizers.50 In fact, Congress was so concerned about this that the 
screening process for those implementing the Smith–Mundt Act’s 
international broadcasting program was “more stringent than the one given 
to people working on the atomic bomb during the war.”51 Consequently, 
given this acute concern over those responsible for international 
broadcasting, it is doubtful that Congress would have risked allowing the 
 
46 Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 4542, 4543 (Aug. 4, 1953) (transferring all 
broadcasting operations and educational exchange services from the State Department to the USIA). 
47 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 8 
of 1953 Relating to the Establishment of the U.S. Information Agency (June 1, 1953), in OFFICE OF THE 
FEDERAL REG., PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 
1953, at 350 (1960). 
48 See, e.g., Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 9. 
49 § 1461. 
50 See id. § 1434 (“No citizen or resident of the United States, whether or not now in the employ of 
the Government, may be employed or assigned to duties by the Government under this chapter until 
such individual has been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a report thereon has 
been made to the Secretary of State . . . .”).  
51 Paulu, supra note 9, at 311. 
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State Department to freely disseminate its programming within the United 
States. 
Further, the domestic dissemination of government-produced 
programming would have been politically toxic. Congress did not want to 
draw parallels with the government of the Soviet Union, which was widely 
believed to be inundating its people with propaganda at the time.52 
Additionally, Americans were tired of watching the government-produced 
programming that was widely broadcast within the United States during 
World War II53—subjecting them to more such programming so soon after 
the War likely would have resulted in public outcry.54  
Thus, even though no explicit ban on the domestic dissemination of 
government-produced programming existed in the original version of the 
Smith–Mundt Act, it was forbidden in practice.55 
B. 1954–1971: Applying the Smith–Mundt Act 
For a dozen years, the de facto domestic dissemination ban remained 
untouched and untested. Then, in 1965, Congress passed a joint resolution 
(1965 Resolution) permitting the domestic release of a USIA film on the 
life of President John F. Kennedy, entitled Years of Lightning, Day of 
Drums.56 The 1965 Resolution permitted the USIA to transfer copies of the 
film to the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and gave the 
Center exclusive rights to distribute the program for viewing within the 
 
52 See ROBERT CONQUEST, REFLECTIONS ON A RAVAGED CENTURY 101–11 (2000).  
53 See Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 6 (“By the end of World War II, many Americans held a 
negative perception of government propaganda not only because of censorship and misinformation by 
the American government but also because of the extensive anti-Jew and pro-Nazi propaganda 
disseminated in Germany throughout the 1930s.”); Paulu, supra note 9, at 300 (“In peacetime . . . 
[Americans] had always opposed government information services . . . . The passage of the [Smith–
Mundt Act], therefore, marked a significant departure from traditional American policy.”). 
54 “Americans insisted that government efforts at persuasion at home . . . should remain benign, 
affirming their popular belief that government should not be the guardian of the public conscience, and 
that the electorate was capable of making rational choices free of undue influence from government 
itself . . . .” Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 6. 
55 A de facto ban on the domestic dissemination of government-produced programming was 
confirmed “by Congress’[s] perceived need to pass legislation in order to permit the domestic release of 
certain [government-produced] films.” Brett Holladay, Making the Argument that the Smith-Mundt Act 
Has Little Control over the Press’ Publication of U.S. Government-Produced Foreign News, 10 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 608, 614 (2012). 
56 Joint Resolution: To Allow the Showing in the United States of the United States Information 
Agency Film “John F. Kennedy—Years of Lightning, Day of Drums,” Pub. L. No. 89-274, 79 Stat. 
1009 (1965). The film can now be viewed in its entirety online. Bruce Herschensohn, John F. Kennedy: 
Years of Lightning/Day of Drums, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PvN5ecqCFk0 [http://perma.cc/D3UM-EVQY]. 
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United States.57 However, concerns over creating precedent for future 
domestic dissemination of USIA material led Congress to clarify that the 
1965 Resolution was “limited solely to the film” and was not to be 
construed so as “to establish a precedent for making other materials 
prepared by the [USIA] available for general distribution in the United 
States.”58 Although Congress was willing to give a one-time pass for a 
particularly relevant piece of government-produced programming, it was 
not willing to condone all dissemination of such programming, stating: 
Any documentary film which has been, is now being, or is hereafter produced 
by any Government department or agency . . . concerning the life, character, 
and public service of any [Government official] . . . shall not be distributed or 
shown in public in this country during the lifetime of the said official or after 
the death of such official unless authorized by law in each specific case.59 
Congress’s compulsion to pass a resolution permitting the domestic 
dissemination of a single USIA film demonstrates that the Smith–Mundt 
Act effectively prohibited the domestic dissemination of government-
produced programming.60 If there were any doubts about whether the 
Smith–Mundt Act contained a de facto ban on the domestic dissemination 
of government-produced programming, the 1965 Resolution put those 
doubts to rest.61 
The reach of the de facto domestic dissemination ban on government-
produced programming, however, remained unresolved. In 1967, the U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Information issued a report that advocated for 
easing the restrictions on the availability of USIA materials within the 
United States.62 Noting that there was “nothing in the [Smith–Mundt Act] 
specifically forbidding making USIA materials available to American 
audiences,”63 the Commission suggested that it was time for the “walls [to] 
come down” and allow the American public to readily access this 
information.64 Not unlike modern-day proponents for repealing the 
domestic dissemination ban, the Commission believed that allowing 
Americans to access government-produced programming would promote 
 
57 § 2, 79 Stat. at 1009. This transfer of the film and its rights was not complimentary, however—
Congress charged the Center $122,000 to “reimburse the United States Government for its expenditures 
in connection with production of the film.” Id. § 3, 79 Stat. at 1009. 
58 Id. § 1, 79 Stat. at 1009. 
59 Id. § 4, 79 Stat. at 1009 (emphasis added). 
60 See Gormly, supra note 6, at 196. 
61 See id.  
62 FRANK STANTON ET AL., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INFO., THE TWENTY-SECOND REPORT OF 
THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION 22 (1967). 
63 Id. at 22–23. 
64 Id. 
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government transparency and academic study.65 However, the Commission 
stopped short of advocating for the active dissemination of these materials 
within the United States; instead, it recommended only that Congress 
“‘mak[e] available’ USIA materials, not [promote] their domestic 
distribution.”66 Despite this reservation, the Commission’s underlying 
stance was clear—the domestic dissemination ban should be relaxed. Yet, 
there was no push from Congress to reform the domestic dissemination 
ban. In fact, the opposite occurred: in the years that followed the 
Commission’s report, Congress further emphasized that government-
produced materials were not to be disseminated within the United States. 
C. 1972–2009: Cementing the Ban 
The first true test to the de facto domestic dissemination ban came in 
1972 when Senator James L. Buckley (D-N.Y.) requested a USIA-
produced film entitled Czechoslovakia 1968 to be rebroadcast on New 
York television.67 Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) opposed Senator 
Buckley’s request, believing that the USIA could only disseminate its 
programming abroad.68 Acting Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, 
arguing on Senator Buckley’s behalf, advocated that the proposed 
rebroadcast did not violate the text of the Smith–Mundt Act.69 Although not 
“altogether free from doubt,” Mr. Kleindienst believed that the Smith–
Mundt Act did not intend to prohibit all dissemination of USIA-produced 
programming within the United States;70 after all, he argued, the agency 
could “make . . . available upon request” such programming to members of 
Congress.71 Senator Fulbright and other members of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations vehemently disagreed with Mr. Kleindienst’s 
interpretation of the Smith–Mundt Act, calling it a “distortion of [] 
legislative intent.”72 Specifically, the Committee was concerned that by 
allowing Senator Buckley to air the film, it would “pave the way for the 
wholesale distribution of USIA materials” within the United States.73 In an 
attempt to close this loophole in the Smith–Mundt Act, Senator Fulbright 
proposed legislation to establish a “blanket prohibition” on the domestic 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 23. 
67 Holladay, supra note 55, at 614; Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 9. 
68 S. REP. NO. 92-754, at 83 (1972). 
69 Id. at 83–84. 
70 Id. at 84. 
71 Id. However, Mr. Kleindienst himself recognized that domestic dissemination had its limits, 
stating that the USIA could not “actively engage in the domestic dissemination of its materials.” Id. 
72 Id. at 85. 
73 Id. 
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distribution of USIA-produced programming.74 Soon thereafter, this blanket 
prohibition was passed as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
of 1972 (1972 Amendment).75 
The 1972 Amendment made the Smith–Mundt Act’s de facto domestic 
dissemination ban a de jure ban by explicitly forbidding the distribution of 
USIA programming within the United States.76 However, the 1972 
Amendment did more that make official the long-standing de facto 
dissemination ban; it also expanded the public’s access to government-
produced programming by adding “research students and scholars” to the 
list of those who could legally examine these materials at specified 
government agencies.77 In effect, the 1972 Amendment addressed both the 
goals of Senator Fulbright, i.e., providing safeguards against the 
widespread dissemination of influential government-produced 
programming within the United States, and those of the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Information, i.e., increasing public access to these 
otherwise inaccessible materials. 
Thirteen years later,78 the 1972 Amendment’s explicit prohibition on 
the domestic dissemination of government-produced materials was further 
strengthened. In 1985, Senator Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.) drafted an 
amendment to the Smith–Mundt Act (1985 Amendment) that proposed 
reinforcing the domestic dissemination ban.79 Senator Zorinsky was chiefly 
concerned with the USIA’s “second mandate,” which permitted the Agency 
to initiate cultural training programs for U.S. citizens.80 He believed that 
this mandate could be used to “propagandize” the American people to 
 
74 Id. 
75 Pub. L. No. 92-352, § 204, 86 Stat. 489, 494 (1972). 
76 Id. (“Any [government-produced material] shall not be disseminated within the United States, its 
territories, or possessions, but, on request, shall be available in the English language at the Department 
of State, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination only by 
representatives of United States press . . . , and by research students and scholars, and, on request, shall 
be made available for examination only to Members of Congress.”). By 1989, the USIA was allowing 
any person to examine these materials regardless of whether she was a journalist, research student, or 
scholar. Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1194 n.19 (S.D. Iowa 1989). 
77 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976). 
78 The years between the 1972 Amendment and the 1985 Amendment were marked by a 
restructuring of government broadcasting agencies. In 1973, the Board for International Broadcasting 
(BIB) was formed to broadcast government-produced programming specifically in countries without a 
free press. See Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-129, §§ 2, 4, 87 Stat. 
456, 457–59. In 1977, under the Carter Administration, the USIA was recast as the International 
Communication Agency (ICA) in an attempt to rebrand the organization as one that showed “a decent 
respect for the opinions of mankind.” 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1996); Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, 91 
Stat. 1636. The ICA was short-lived, however, and in 1982 the agency was redesignated the USIA. 
Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-241, § 303, 96 Stat. 
273, 291 (1982). 
79 131 CONG. REC. 14,945 (1985).  
80 Id. 
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adopt pro-communist views on foreign policy issues.81 In furtherance of his 
proposal to reinforce the domestic dissemination ban, Senator Zorinsky 
memorably stated: “The American taxpayer certainly does not need or want 
his tax dollars used to support U.S. Government propaganda directed at 
him or her.”82 In its final form, the 1985 Amendment required that “no 
funds authorized to be appropriated to the [USIA] shall be used to 
influence public opinion in the United States, and no program material 
prepared by the [USIA] shall be distributed within the United States.”83 Just 
as Senator Zorinsky intended, the 1985 Amendment did little to change 
existing policy regarding the domestic dissemination ban. Rather, it served 
to foreclose any possibility of the USIA disseminating its programming 
within the United States. 
The passage of the 1985 Amendment marked the zenith of the 
domestic dissemination ban on government-produced programming. After 
that date, cracks began to develop in the wall that Senators Fulbright and 
Zorinsky built. In 1990, Congress passed an amendment to the Smith–
Mundt Act (1990 Amendment) that required the USIA director to “make 
[programming] available to the Archivist of the United States, for domestic 
distribution . . . 12 years after the preparation of the material.”84 Although 
the 1990 Amendment was of little value for Americans seeking current 
information on the government’s international broadcasting efforts,85 it 
afforded citizens greater access to these materials for research and study 
without raising concerns about the USIA creating programming 
specifically for the purpose of “propagandizing” the American public. 
The USIA was the primary agency for producing and broadcasting 
programming overseas from its creation through the mid-1990s.86 In 1994, 
all government broadcasting efforts targeting countries without a free press 
were transferred to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a new 
government agency under State Department control.87 In 1998, the USIA 
 
81 Id. Similar language appears in the original Smith–Mundt Act. 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II 1948) 
(“The Congress declares that the objectives of this chapter are to enable the Government of the United 
States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual 
understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” (emphasis 
added)). 
82 131 CONG. REC. 14,945. 
83 22 U.S.C. § 1461-1a (1988).  
84 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 202, 
104 Stat. 15, 49 (1990). Materials over twelve years old were thought to be devoid of any ability to 
propagandize. 
85 Gormly, supra note 6, at 198. 
86 However, there was a brief period during the Carter Administration when the USIA was 
reorganized and rebranded as the ICA. See supra note 78. 
87 United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, §§ 304, 310, 108 
Stat. 382, 434, 442. 
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was abolished and its responsibilities reassigned to the BBG.88 Later that 
year, the BBG became a government-funded, independent agency in charge 
of overseeing all government-sponsored, nonmilitary international 
broadcasting.89 Although the source of government broadcasting shifted 
from an integrated, government-controlled agency to an independent, 
government-funded agency, the goals and operations of the Smith–Mundt 
Act—disseminating pro-American programming overseas—remained the 
same. 
The most significant development in this period had little to do with 
the federal government. Advances in sophisticated information technology, 
such as the Internet, cellular phones, and satellite television, was rapidly 
changing how news was distributed and consumed. Just as private 
broadcasters would be compelled to adapt to these technological 
developments, so too would the federal government. In the mid-1990s, the 
legal academy predicted that the free flow of information between 
countries would soon render the Smith–Mundt Act’s domestic 
dissemination ban unenforceable.90 However, the demise of the domestic 
dissemination ban would not occur until almost twenty years later. 
D. 2010–2013: Repealing the Ban 
1. The 2010 Bill.—The first attempt at repealing the domestic 
dissemination ban came in July 2010. Representatives Mac Thornberry (R-
Tex.) and Adam Smith (D-Wash.) introduced “The Smith–Mundt 
Modernization Act of 2010” (2010 Bill) into Congress.91 At its core, the 
2010 Bill was a national security measure designed to “modernize 
authorities to fight and win the war of ideas against violent extremist 
ideologies over the [I]nternet and other mediums of information” within the 
United States.92 However, contradictory language within the 2010 Bill 
would have made its stated goal difficult to achieve. On the one hand, the 
2010 Bill would have abolished the domestic dissemination ban, allowing 
the State Department and the BBG to freely disseminate government-
produced programming within the United States.93 On the other, it would 
 
88 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–776 (1998); Berkowitz, supra note 6, at 279. 
89 112 Stat. at 2681-776. 
90 See e.g., Gormly, supra note 6, at 202–04. Gormly also believed the ban violated information 
policy, contradicted the Freedom of Information Act, and frustrated the USIA’s ability to perform its 
mission. Id. at 192–93. 
91 H.R. 5729, 111th Cong. (2010). Eight other representatives cosponsored the bill. Id. 
92 Id. However, this purpose seems inherently unachievable given the bill’s prohibition on 
“influencing” or “propagandizing” the American people: any attempt by the State Department to “win 
the war of ideas” within the United States inherently would be an exercise in influencing public 
opinion. 
93 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
526 
have strengthened the 1985 Amendment’s prohibition on “influencing 
public opinion” in the United States94 by preventing the federal government 
from “propagandizing” the American people.95 Like the Smith–Mundt 
Act’s previous amending legislation, the 2010 Bill attempted to harmonize 
allowing Americans greater access to government-produced programming 
with barring the federal government from unduly influencing free public 
discourse. However, rather than forge a workable compromise similar to 
the 1972 Amendment,96 the 2010 Bill attempted to adopt two incompatible 
positions—permission and prohibition—which made the legislation 
impracticable. Unsurprisingly, the 2010 Bill died in Congress.97 
Despite its shortcomings, the 2010 Bill is notable because it signaled a 
turning point in how Congress perceived the Smith–Mundt Act’s domestic 
dissemination ban. In decades prior, Congress was inclined to reinforce the 
domestic dissemination ban, as it did in 1965, 1972, and 1985,98 but by 
2010, Congress was willing to consider a complete repeal.99 This radical 
change in perception is attributable to two major developments. First, 
advances in information technology allowed people to communicate freely, 
severely diminishing the government’s power to control the media. 
Consequently, many began to doubt the effectiveness of state-made 
propaganda generally,100 the domestic dissemination ban’s enforceability,101 
and the overall feasibility of the statutory regime surrounding government 
broadcasting.102 But the most salient reason for amending the Smith–Mundt 
Act was to curb the threat of domestic terrorism. During the Cold War, 
Congress was eager to distinguish the United States from the Soviet Union. 
One way to do this, as demonstrated by Senator Zorinsky’s 1985 
 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 The 1972 Amendment mirrors the dual aims of the 2010 Bill, i.e., promoting government 
transparency and establishing safeguards against the dissemination of government propaganda. See 
supra Part I.C.  
97 The 2010 Bill died after being referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. H.R. 5729 (111th): 
Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2010, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
111/hr5729 [http://perma.cc/Y38Z-NC53]. 
98 Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that up 
through 1998 “Congress[] repeated[ly] amend[ed] the [Smith–Mundt] Act to clarify and strengthen the 
ban on domestic distribution of USIA materials”). 
99 See H.R. 5729. Additionally, a more conservative bill proposed by Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) 
would have decreased the permissible release period from twelve years to two years. Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, S. 2971, 111th Cong. § 127 (2010). 
100 See Adam Weinstein, Is Congress Really Authorizing US Propaganda at Home?, MOTHER 
JONES (May 22, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/05/congress-propaganda 
[http://perma.cc/BS89-XVFB]. 
101 Gormly, supra note 6, at 220. 
102 See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL 
YEARS 2010 AND 2011, S. REP. NO. 111-301, at 13 (2010).  
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Amendment, was to highlight the differences between how the 
governments of the United States and the Soviet Union interacted with the 
media. Congress was able to trumpet the federal government’s relative 
unwillingness to influence the media in large part because government-
produced programming was primarily needed overseas to counter anti-
American sentiment in countries of strategic importance. After the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the rise of terrorism, however, government-produced 
programming was needed to counteract anti-American sentiment abroad 
and at home.103 It was this factor—national security—that spurred serious 
discussions in Congress for repealing the domestic dissemination ban.104 
Overall, the 2010 Bill indicates that Congress was willing to break 
with decades of precedent by permitting government-produced 
programming to be broadcast domestically in the name of combating 
terrorism, but its conflicted language also indicates that Congress had not 
lost sight of the potential danger of allowing the government to influence 
public opinion through “domestic propaganda.”105 Finding the right balance 
between disseminating government-produced programming within the 
United States and preventing it from unduly influencing free American 
discourse, however, proved difficult, which is why the 2010 Bill failed to 
gain traction in Congress. 
2. The 2012 Bill.—In 2012, Representatives Thornberry and Smith 
again introduced legislation repealing the domestic dissemination ban 
contained within the Smith–Mundt Act.106 This bill, entitled the “Smith–
Mundt Modernization Act of 2012” (2012 Bill), was similar to the 2010 
Bill except that it omitted the 2010 Bill’s prohibition on “propagandizing” 
and included clear carve-outs that permitted the government to broadcast 
relatively freely within the United States. Unlike the 2010 Bill, the 2012 
Bill was marketed not as national security legislation, but as government 
transparency legislation.107 Belying its national security roots, however, the 
2012 Bill was transposed into the voluminous “National Defense 
 
103 See H.R. 5729.  
104 Indeed, national security was the stated reason for the repeal in the 2010 Bill. Id. But see, e.g., 
Understanding the Smith–Mundt Modernization Act, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.
heritage.org/events/2012/05/Smith–Mundt [http://perma.cc/H3KU-VQSK] (discussing how the repeal 
of the domestic dissemination ban is grounded in considerations other than national security, such as 
adapting to the realities of information technology and calls for greater government transparency). 
105 See H.R. 5729; see also S. REP. NO. 111-301, at 13 (noting that a two-year dissemination 
waiting period would assuage “domestic propaganda” concerns).  
106 H.R. 5736, 112th Cong. (2012). It is noteworthy that, unlike previous amendments to the 
Smith–Mundt Act, the congressional record surrounding both the 2010 Bill and the Smith–Mundt 
Modernization Act of 2012 is sparse. 
107 See Greenwald, supra note 8. 
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013”108 (2013 Amendment), an omnibus 
defense spending bill.109 It is unclear why the 2012 Bill was inserted into 
this lengthy piece of legislation, but it may have been to avoid a 
contentious debate like that which preceded the passage of the original 
Smith–Mundt Act in 1948. Regardless of the actual reason, the tactic 
proved successful: the 2013 Amendment passed both Houses in late 
2012,110 and on January 2, 2013, President Barack Obama signed the 
legislation into law.111 With that, the sixty-four-year-old domestic 
dissemination ban was suddenly and unceremoniously abolished. 
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 AMENDMENT 
The 2013 Amendment is neither a dramatic breakthrough in 
government transparency nor a harbinger of an Orwellian state. Rather, the 
2013 Amendment merely grants the State Department and the BBG new 
freedom to broadcast within the United States. 
A. New and Preexisting Legal Restrictions 
Although the 2013 Amendment repealed the blanket ban on the 
domestic dissemination of government-produced programming, some 
restrictions remain. Analyzing these restrictions is important to 
understanding how government-produced materials may be disseminated 
domestically; however, they do not, either separately or as a whole, 
significantly impede the State Department and the BBG from distributing 
their programming to the American public. 
1. The “Upon Request” Restriction.—The “upon request” 
restriction112 is a holdover from earlier versions of the Smith–Mundt Act.113 
As its name implies, this restriction requires the State Department and the 
BBG to disseminate materials within the United States only “upon 
 
108 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 Stat. 1632, 1957–59 (2013). 
109 There were immaterial drafting changes between the 2012 Bill and the version that appeared in 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. Compare id., with H.R. 5736. 
110 H.R. 4310 (112th): National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4310 [http://perma.cc/DFF7-PXYG]. 
111 Id.; see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the 
President on H.R. 4310 (Jan. 2, 2013) (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310). Although President Obama comments on several 
sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, he does not mention the 
section that contains the text of the 2012 Bill. Id. 
112 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2012).  
113 See, e.g., id. (Supp. II 1948) (“[Materials], on request, shall be available in the English language 
at the Department of State . . . .”). 
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request.”114 In other words, the State Department and the BBG may not 
disseminate their materials on their own volition, but may only make them 
“available” to those who wish to access them. Prior to the 2013 
Amendment, the only legal way to view contemporary government-
produced materials was to examine them at the agencies themselves.115 
Now, one may obtain broadcast-quality copies of this programming merely 
by requesting them from the BBG.116 But the most direct and cost-effective 
way to access State Department- and BBG-produced materials is simply to 
view them online.117 The BBG posts nearly all of its content on the Internet 
for free,118 such as news articles and broadcasts produced by Voice of 
America (VOA),119 Radio Free Europe,120 Radio Free Asia,121 and other 
 
114 Id. (2012). Additionally, the requesting third party may be required to reimburse BBG for 
“reasonable costs.” Id.; Domestic Requests for Broadcasting Board of Governors Program Materials, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,584, 39,587 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter BBG Regulations] (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 
502).  
115 § 1461(b)(1) (2006); see also Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request made by academics and journalists for 
release of Internet addresses and programming materials generated by the USIA because the materials 
were exempt from disclosure); Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Iowa 1989) 
(affirming the USIA’s decision to prohibit copying USIA materials verbatim and disseminating them 
within the United States because doing so would have been in violation of the Smith–Mundt Act). 
Notably, Americans could legally view materials more than twelve years old after the early 1990s. See 
supra note 84 and accompanying text. In practice, however, this time limitation was immaterial; 
Americans living within the United States could readily obtain BBG material in violation of the pre-
2013 Smith–Mundt Act. Daniel C. Walsh, The History of the U.S. Information and Educational 
Exchange Act of 1948 and Three Arguments for the Termination of Its Prohibition on Domestic Release 
of Information, INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y, Summer 2011, at 1, 10–12. The federal government did not 
pursue legal action against these violators or the BBG, in part because the Smith–Mundt Act contained 
“no criminal provisions . . . no penalties at all.” Id. at 11 (quoting former USIA attorney John 
Lindberg). 
116 § 1461(b)(1) (2012). The BBG may charge fees at its discretion for access to its broadcast-
quality programming. Id. 
117 See BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,586. The BBG defines anyone who visits one of 
their websites as a “Requestor.” Id. (“The Agency makes program materials available to Requestors 
through the Agency’s news and information Web sites designed for foreign audiences.”). Arguably, 
accessing a website is a volitional act; when a user clicks on a hyperlink to the BBG website or enters a 
BBG web address in a web browser, the user is requesting to view that material. However, posting 
material on a website may not always result in the user intentionally accessing the material. For 
example, if another website provides an unattributed link to the BBG website, the user may be directed 
to BBG content without the user’s knowledge. Whether the request must be intentional, however, is not 
addressed in either the statute or the BBG regulations. 
118 Id. (stating that there is no fee for accessing material on BBG websites). 
119 VOICE OF AMERICA, http://www.voanews.com/ [http://perma.cc/K74G-HTQY].  
120 RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, http://www.rferl.org/ [http://perma.cc/H6DB-872H].  
121 RADIO FREE ASIA, http://www.rfa.org/english/ [http://perma.cc/9PMM-2NJT]. 
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government-funded news services, many of which are in foreign 
languages.122 
At first blush, the upon request restriction appears to prevent the State 
Department and the BBG from imposing their programming on the 
American public. For example, under this restriction, the State Department 
and the BBG are prohibited from directly broadcasting their programming 
over a government-owned-and-operated loudspeaker in a town square, 
because in such a scenario, no one requested the material—it was 
distributed to the American public without one or more citizens’ consent. 
However, the State Department and the BBG are not barred from 
disseminating their materials if they do not obtain the consent of every 
citizen. Turning again to the loudspeaker example, a government-produced 
program may be rebroadcast publicly if one private citizen first requested 
the program and then rebroadcasts it herself. Even though the American 
public may not have consented to listening to these broadcasts, because one 
person consented to the broadcast, the upon request restriction is satisfied. 
In essence, the upon request restriction permits the same distribution 
method Senator Buckley attempted when he sought to rebroadcast the 
government-produced film Czechoslovakia 1978, albeit on a much larger 
scale: under the current Smith–Mundt Act, any citizen may  attempt to 
rebroadcast government-produced programming—not just members of 
Congress. 
The ease of rebroadcasting via third parties is troubling because the 
potential for misleading the public is arguably greater than if the 
government had broadcast this programming itself; because the message is 
emanating from a private entity, the average citizen assumes that the 
program was not produced by the government. Still, the upon request 
restriction provides protection from the State Department and the BBG 
directly imposing their message on the American public. But once 
government-produced programming is in a third party’s hands, there are 
virtually no restrictions on dissemination.123 
a. The request procedure.—Requesting government-produced 
programming is relatively straightforward.124 Any American may simply 
visit one of the BBG’s many websites to access their content free of 
 
122 E.g., ALHURRA, http://www.alhurra.com/ [http://perma.cc/W3CJ-EY8D] (Arabic); NOTICIAS 
MARTÍ, http://www.martinoticias.com/ [http://perma.cc/F7Z3-WR26] (Spanish); RADIO SAWA, 
http://www.radiosawa.com/ [http://perma.cc/5VRZ-HPQW] (Arabic).  
123 The BBG may deny a request to use these materials if the third party acts contrary to the BBG’s 
governing laws, regulations, and principles. BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,587. However, 
there is nothing in the BBG regulations that would revoke the third party’s right to rebroadcast these 
materials. Id. at 39,584–87. 
124 See supra note 117. 
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charge.125 However, requesting broadcast-quality copies of State 
Department- and BBG-produced programming—which may be used by 
television and radio stations among others—requires a more formal 
process. 
There are two types of requests that a third party can make for 
broadcast-quality materials: a “one-time” request126 and an “ongoing 
subscription” request.127 In a one-time request, a citizen, media entity, or 
organization makes a request to the BBG for programming, and the BBG 
provides a broadcast-quality copy to the requestor.128 The request must 
serve the BBG’s “statutory mission” and any other applicable laws and 
regulations,129 and if it does not, the BBG may deny the request.130 The 
BBG may also deny requests for several other reasons, including if the 
requestor does not comply with third-party license requirements or neglects 
to pay the BBG’s discretionary disbursement fee.131 
An ongoing subscription request is similar to a one-time request, 
except that it allows the BBG to make materials available on an “ongoing 
basis” through a “subscription agreement.”132 In effect, this allows a 
domestic entity to rebroadcast BBG programming within the United States, 
almost as though the State Department or the BBG were broadcasting the 
materials themselves. Through a subscription agreement, the third party 
does not need to comply with the letter of the upon request requirement for 
each piece of State Department- or BBG-produced programming. Once a 
third party establishes a subscription agreement, that third party may 
receive and rebroadcast government-produced programming without 
having to file another request with the State Department or the BBG. 
BBG regulations impose two notable restrictions on an ongoing 
subscription agreement.133 First, the ongoing subscription broadcasts must 
only rebroadcast BBG programming to “complement, rather than 
duplicate” the programming produced by other private U.S. broadcasters.134 
Thus, even under the amended Smith–Mundt Act, the State Department 
 
125 See supra notes 117–18. 
126 BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,586. 
127 Id. at 39,587.  
128 Id. at 39,586. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 39,587. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 22 U.S.C. § 6202 (2012) (enumerating the BBG’s standards and principles); BROAD. BD. OF 
GOVERNORS INT’L BROAD. BUREAU, II BAM 160 DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAM MATERIALS 
1 (2013), available at http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2013/11/2-160-Domestic-Distribution-of-
Program-Materials.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y4RT-T5Z6]. 
134 BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS INT’L BROAD. BUREAU, supra note 133, at 2; see also §§ 1462, 
6202(a)(3)–(4). 
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and the BBG may not use third parties as a means to compete with private 
broadcasters currently operating within the United States. Second, third-
party broadcasters may not use government-produced programming to 
“develop audiences within the United States.”135 What constitutes 
“developing an audience” is, however, unclear—the criteria are simply 
undefined. Although there is considerable uncertainty as to what 
developing an audience entails, there already appears to be an exception to 
this rule. BBG regulations explicitly encourage disseminating its materials 
to those broadcasters located within U.S.-based “foreign diaspora 
communities.”136 The BBG attempts to reconcile this tactic with the 
aforementioned prohibition on developing an audience within the United 
States by classifying people who belong to a foreign diaspora community 
as members of a non-U.S. country. This classification scheme supposedly 
allows the agency to target them as part of the BBG’s “foreign policy 
mission.”137 
2. Audience Restrictions.—The upon request restriction is not the 
only restriction contained within the amended Smith–Mundt Act. Two 
related restrictions introduced in the 2013 Amendment prohibit the State 
Department and the BBG from either creating programming for a domestic 
audience or broadcasting programming within the United States first before 
disseminating it abroad.138 In other words, although the State Department 
and the BBG may broadcast their programming within the United States, 
the American people can be neither the intended nor the initial audience. 
Although these two restrictions may appear to provide substantial 
protection from the State Department and the BBG “propagandizing” the 
American people, in practice they provide only minimal safeguards against 
widespread dissemination of government-produced programming. The first 
restriction—that government-produced programming may not be intended 
for an American audience—is nearly impossible to verify. In certain 
circumstances, programming intended for a foreign audience may be 
indistinguishable from programming intended for a domestic audience. Say 
the BBG produced a piece of programming endorsing U.S. intervention in a 
foreign country that was first broadcast in an English-speaking country 
such as the United Kingdom, Australia, or India. Barring an in-depth 
 
135 BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS INT’L BROAD. BUREAU, supra note 133, at 1. 
136 See id.  
137 Id. This exception to the prohibition on developing a domestic audience requires further inquiry. 
For example: Does the BBG believe that it can only disseminate its materials to domestic broadcasters 
located in foreign diaspora communities? What are the criteria to determine which communities are 
foreign diaspora communities? And would a third-party broadcaster be permitted to target only non-
U.S. citizens, naturalized U.S. citizens, foreign-language-speaking U.S. citizens, or some combination 
thereof? 
138 § 1461(b)(1). 
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investigation into the story’s development from conception to broadcast, 
there would be no way to determine whether the programming was 
intended for a foreign audience or an American audience.139 The second 
restriction—that government-produced programming must not be 
disseminated within the United States before it is disseminated abroad—
has little significance.140 Because modern technology allows for the 
instantaneous transmission of information across borders, this restriction 
may result in only a negligible delay in the domestic dissemination of 
government-produced programming—particularly for programming that 
does not require translation. 
3. The Influence Prohibition.—The most striking restriction in the 
amended Smith–Mundt Act is paradoxically the least meaningful. The 
amended Smith–Mundt Act retains the text of the 1985 Amendment drafted 
by Senator Zorinsky, which states that “[n]o funds authorized to be 
appropriated to the [State Department] or the [BBG] shall be used to 
influence public opinion in the United States.”141 Standing alone, this 
“influence prohibition” seems to prevent the State Department and the 
BBG from disseminating government-produced programming within the 
United States. After all, the fundamental purpose of this programming is to 
influence public opinion. 
But when the influence prohibition is read in conjunction with the 
surrounding text, it provides little—if any—restriction on the conduct of 
the State Department or the BBG. The amended Smith–Mundt Act 
provides two enormous carve-outs to the influence prohibition. First, the 
amended Smith–Mundt Act states that the influence prohibition does not 
“prohibit or delay” the State Department or the BBG from “providing 
information about its operations, policies, programs, or program 
material.”142 Second, the Act states that the influence prohibition does not 
“prohibit or delay” the State Department or the BBG from “making [their 
programming] available, to the media, public, or Congress, in accordance 
with other applicable law.”143 In other words, the revised Smith–Mundt Act 
 
139 Even if the BBG were guilty of violating this provision, there are no clear consequences. See id. 
§ 1461. And, even if they do violate the statutory restrictions in §§ 1461 and 1461-1a, recent history has 
shown that there are virtually no consequences. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 115, at 12. 
140 It is generally believed that the older the programming is, the less impact it will have as 
propaganda. Walsh, supra note 115, at 12. 
141 § 1461-1a(a); Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 Stat. 1632, 1958 (2013). 
142 § 1461-1a(a). A version of this exemption has existed since 1994. Id. § 1461-1a (1994). 
However, the 2013 Amendment greatly expanded the scope of disclosure allowed by the State 
Department and the BBG: instead of merely allowing these agencies to “respond[] to inquiries . . . about 
its operations, policies, or programs” as before, id. amend. (2012), the State Department and the BBG 
may now freely “provid[e] information about its operations, policies, programs, or program material” to 
the U.S. public, id. (emphasis added). 
143 Id. (1994). 
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exempts all programming produced by the State Department and the BBG 
from being subject to the influence prohibition, rendering this once 
powerful restriction irrelevant.144 
4. The “Covert Propaganda” Prohibition.—Perhaps the most 
meaningful restriction on the widespread domestic dissemination of 
government-produced programming lies outside of the Smith–Mundt Act. 
The State Department’s appropriations bill prohibits the agency from 
disseminating “propaganda” within the United States without the 
authorization of Congress.145 According to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), programming is propaganda if it is: (1) self-
aggrandizing, (2) purely partisan in nature, or (3) covert.146 Given that the 
State Department and the BBG overwhelmingly produce apolitical news 
stories, the first two categories—self-aggrandizement and partisan 
materials—are largely inapplicable.147 However, the third category—
“covert propaganda”—is relevant to the State Department and the BBG. 
Unlike the first two categories, covert propaganda does not restrict subject 
matter; rather, it restricts the means of distribution. Even the most 
innocuous State Department or BBG programming could be considered 
covert propaganda if, without congressional approval, it is “circulated as 
the ostensible position of parties outside the agency”148 through 
“surreptitious means.”149 
Essentially, an agency violates the covert propaganda prohibition if the 
intended audience cannot ascertain the proper source of the government-
produced materials.150 For example, in 1987, the State Department paid 
unaffiliated consultants to write op-eds in support of the government’s 
policy on Central America who in turn submitted the op-eds to newspapers 
 
144 The BBG similarly believes that the influence prohibition does not restrict it from broadcasting 
within the United States. In its agency regulations, the BBG maintains that although it is ostensibly 
prohibited from influencing public opinion in the United States, it “may . . . [m]ake program materials 
available in the Unites [sic] States, when appropriate.” BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,586. 
145 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7055, 125 Stat. 786, 
1243–44 (2011). 
146 KEVIN R. KOSAR, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTION ON EXECUTIVE 
AGENCY ACTIVITIES 6 (2005). Executive agencies defer to the GAO (formerly known as the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office) for interpretation because “publicity” and “propaganda” are not 
defined in the legislation. 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-197 (3d ed. 2004).  
147 See 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 146, at 4-199 to -201.  
148 See id. at 4-202. 
149 KOSAR, supra note 146, at 7. However, government agencies may legally distribute unattributed 
programming if  (1) it is impossible to verify (e.g., promoting liberty generally), or (2) it influences only 
the emotions of the public (e.g., placing an American flag behind a government spokesperson during a 
speech). Id. 
150 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *4 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 4, 
2005).  
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under their own names.151 The GAO found that the State Department 
violated the covert propaganda prohibition because the newspapers’ readers 
incorrectly attributed the source of the op-eds to someone other than the 
government agency.152 Similarly, in 2005, the GAO found a government 
agency guilty of disseminating covert propaganda when it distributed 
misleading, unattributed video news clips to television broadcasters.153 
The covert propaganda prohibition provides the most promising check 
on the State Department and the BBG from freely disseminating their 
unattributed materials within the United States because, unlike the other 
restrictions mentioned above, it has a track record of enforcement. 
However, like these other restrictions, it, too, may have little effect in 
practice. First, the covert propaganda prohibition may be inapplicable if the 
2013 Amendment constitutes implicit congressional approval for 
anonymous dissemination of government-produced programming. Broadly 
construed, the 2013 Amendment, by virtue of abolishing the one 
meaningful limitation on the domestic dissemination of government-
produced programming, could be deemed congressional approval to engage 
in otherwise prohibited covert propaganda.154 Even assuming that Congress 
did not grant the State Department and the BBG permission to engage in 
covert propaganda, proving a violation is exceedingly difficult—the agency 
must have “attempt[ed] to persuade or deceive the public through 
surreptitious means”155 beyond “any legitimate doubt.”156 In the unlikely 
event of a violation, the repercussions are not severe;157 in the past, when 
 
151 Dep’t of State’s Office of Pub. Diplomacy for Latin Am. & the Caribbean, 66 Comp. Gen. 707 
(1987). Not all of the consultants’ op-eds were deemed covert State Department propaganda, 
however—some were properly attributed. Id. 
152 See id. at 708. 
153 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *5 (“By its own records, 
ONDCP’s prepackaged news stories reached more than 22 million households, without disclosing to 
any of those viewers—the real audience—that the products they were watching, which ‘reported’ on the 
activities of a government agency, were actually prepared by that government agency, not by a 
seemingly independent third party. This is the essence of the ‘covert propaganda’ violation—agency-
created materials that are ‘misleading as to their origin.’” (citation omitted)); see also Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., B-302710, 2004 WL 1114403, at *11 (Comp. 
Gen. May 19, 2004). 
154 In a 2005 GAO opinion, the ONDCP made a similar argument justifying its use of unattributed 
government-produced programming because of a provision allowing “news media outreach” under the 
Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998. Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 
21443, at *6. Although the ONDCP’s argument failed, similar conduct under the amended Smith–
Mundt Act may be permissible because of the Act’s substantial carve-outs. See supra notes 141–44 and 
accompanying text.  
155 KOSAR, supra note 146, at 7. 
156 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 146, at 4-198. 
157 See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., B-302710, 
2004 WL 1114403, at *11.  
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agencies were found guilty of engaging in covert propaganda, they merely 
submitted a report of wrongdoing to the President and Congress.158 
Overall, because of the uncertainty over whether a violation could 
even occur under the amended Smith–Mundt Act, the difficulty of proving 
a violation, and the absence of meaningful consequences when a violation 
does occur, this restriction cannot be relied upon to prevent the State 
Department and the BBG from engaging in deceptive distribution of 
government-produced programming. Other federal agencies have been 
found guilty of violating similarly worded propaganda prohibitions in 
recent years,159 and it would come as no surprise if the State Department 
and the BBG were to engage in similar activity under the amended Smith–
Mundt Act. 
B. Evaluating the Impact of the 2013 Amendment 
The 2013 Amendment resolves key issues for supporters of national 
security and government transparency. By repealing the Smith–Mundt 
Act’s domestic dissemination ban, the 2013 Amendment permits the State 
Department and the BBG to target those communities that are susceptible 
to the anti-American propaganda that freely streams into the United 
States.160 Additionally, the 2013 Amendment increases government 
transparency by allowing the American public to monitor how the federal 
government is spending taxpayer money on international broadcasting.161 
Although this was an ancillary motive for the 2013 Amendment,162 there is 
nonetheless great value in having researchers, journalists, and academics 
independently analyze how the State Department and the BBG employ 
government-produced programming. Moreover, the 2013 Amendment lets 
the American people access reputable—albeit agenda-driven—news 
sources, which may provide a more holistic picture of various issues. 
Finally, the 2013 Amendment brings the Smith–Mundt Act in line with 
technological realities. In the years leading up to 2013, the State 
Department and the BBG did not police how their materials were 
 
158 See, e.g., Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *8.  
159 See KOSAR, supra note 146, at 1–3 (listing questionable and illegal propaganda activity by 
executive agencies). This general lack of compliance is due in part to federal agencies not having the 
appropriate measures in place to effectively monitor the dissemination of their materials. Id. at 5. 
160 Rebecca A. Keller, Influence Operations and the Internet: A 21st Century Issue, MAXWELL 
PAPER NO. 52, at 69, 75 (2010) (“[N]o . . . law prohibits foreign nations or organizations from targeting 
US citizens with propaganda and/or deception.”). Perhaps the most notable foreign propaganda freely 
accessible by Americans is Russia Today (RT), a quasi-news organization funded by the Russian 
government. See Russia Today TV to Make Unique Contribution to Global Information—German 
Expert, RIA NOVOSTI (July 6, 2005, 9:42 PM), http://en.ria.ru/society/20050607/40486831.html 
[http://perma.cc/67CX-8RDZ].  
161 See Metzgar, supra note 5, at 99. 
162 See supra Part I.D. 
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disseminated within the United States, largely because of the difficulty 
associated with restricting the flow of information in the Internet era.163 
Now, should their materials reach those living in the United States, these 
agencies need not worry about violating the Smith–Mundt Act. 
However, the 2013 Amendment creates new problems. Allowing the 
State Department and the BBG to freely disseminate their materials within 
the United States could compromise free public discourse.164 Neither the 
amended Smith–Mundt Act nor any other law or regulation contains 
substantive limitations on what the State Department or the BBG may 
disseminate within the United States.165 Although there are a number of 
restrictions that the State Department and the BBG must follow, they are 
ineffective, unverifiable, rendered irrelevant by carve-outs, or some 
combination thereof. More critically, there are no meaningful consequences 
should the State Department or BBG violate one or more of these 
restrictions. 
Theoretically, the American people have the ability to elect 
representatives who would defund these agencies should they abuse their 
power. However, this traditional check on government overreach is largely 
ineffective against modern propaganda. Modern propaganda is often 
indistinguishable from privately produced news because it is by-and-large 
truthful and accurate; it gently guides a viewer to adopt a particular point of 
view rather than inundate him with an obvious political message.166 Indeed, 
there is little risk the State Department and the BBG will disseminate 
patently inaccurate or misleading stories. The risk is that these agencies 
will disseminate stories that cover only those issues that advance the 
federal government’s stance, thereby painting an incomplete picture of the 
issue. Thus, it is important that when the government speaks to the people, 
it is clear who is speaking. 
III. IMPLEMENTING ATTRIBUTION 
The potential harm in the domestic dissemination of government-
produced materials does not lie in government broadcasting itself; those 
living in the United States are fully capable of recognizing the biases that 
accompany government-produced programming.167 Rather, the potential 
harm lies in disseminating these programs without attribution. The public 
 
163 Compliance with the Smith–Mundt Act’s domestic dissemination ban leading up to the 2013 
Amendment was questionable. See Walsh, supra note 115, at 9, 12–13. 
164 See infra Part III. 
165 See supra Part II.A. For proposed solutions to this issue, see infra Part III. 
166 See Keller, supra note 160, at 79 (“Propaganda, to be effective, must be believed. To be 
believed, it must credible. To be credible, it must be true.” (quoting Hubert H. Humphrey)). 
167 See Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 6. 
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expects independent analysis when watching private broadcasts.168 When 
the public is misled about the independence of a broadcast, not only are the 
viewers deceived, but also free public discourse as a whole is damaged.169 
Hence, the State Department and BBG must be required to attribute their 
programming.170 
But unlike reinstituting a ban on the domestic dissemination of 
government-produced programming, which is probably unenforceable 
given modern information technology, implementing attribution has a 
realistic chance of success and has already proven feasible in other 
contexts.171 Attribution is also more desirable than banning the domestic 
dissemination of government-produced programming because it prevents 
the government from surreptitiously influencing public opinion without 
denying the American public’s access to these materials.  
As described below, attribution of government-produced programming 
may be achieved in one of two ways: (1) by passing new attribution 
legislation similar to that of the failed Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, 
or (2) by expanding the judicially created government speech doctrine to 
require these agencies to properly attribute any materials they distribute to 
the American public. 
A. Current Government-Produced Programming 
It is common practice for news stations to broadcast news produced by 
others. Private companies and federal government agencies frequently 
produce and distribute video news releases (VNRs) that are then broadcast 
without attribution on news stations across the country.172 According to a 
2003 National Public Radio panel discussion on the use of VNRs, 100% of 
television broadcasters aired VNRs, and many stations aired them several 
times a month.173 
Given the federal government’s willingness to work with broadcasters, 
it is likely that the State Department and the BBG will begin distributing 
 
168 Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 111 (2006). 
169 Id. at 111–12 (“A stealth appeal in the evening news, where the audience may expect greater 
independence . . . is more likely to deceive the audiences. Indeed, it is because such placements are 
likely to deceive that stealth marketers find them valuable. Persuasion is easiest where the audience is 
most credulous and least defended against promotional messages.”). 
170 For examples of federal agencies, including the State Department, disseminating unattributed 
programming, see supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text. 
171 Attribution has been successfully implemented in campaign finance reform, for example. See 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–55, § 305, 116 Stat. 81, 101.  
172 See Janel Alania, Note, The “News” from the Feed Looks Like News Indeed: On Video News 
Releases, the FCC, and the Shortage of Truth in the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, 24 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 229, 233 (2006).  
173 Id. 
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their own VNRs to interested broadcasters. As explained earlier in this 
Note,174 State Department- and BBG-produced programming may be 
provided to an interested broadcaster at no charge.175 The broadcaster 
benefits from this arrangement because airing complimentary programming 
allows the broadcaster to devote more resources to other projects.176 
Typically, VNRs are, in fact, provided to broadcasters for free, because 
under current law,177 neither the entity that produced the VNR nor the 
broadcaster is legally compelled to attribute the source of the material, 
allowing the relationship to persist undetected.178 A broadcaster has little 
incentive to attribute these materials pro forma, because when the VNR is 
aired anonymously, the audience assumes it was produced by the 
broadcaster, thereby maintaining the appearance of credibility. However, 
when VNRs are broadcast without attribution, the consumer does not view 
them in the appropriate context, potentially resulting in a distorted opinion 
of the issue. When this is repeated thousands of times over, society as a 
whole risks unwittingly adopting a biased viewpoint. 
B. Reviving the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005 
In the early 2000s, the federal government widely distributed 
unattributed government-produced programming within the United States. 
From 2003–2005, the federal government spent $1.62 billion on VNRs and 
other public relations programming,179 much of which was aired 
anonymously.180 In response to this questionable practice, Senators Frank 
Lautenberg (D-N.J.) and John Kerry (D-Mass.) introduced a bill entitled 
the “Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005,”181 which would have required the 
federal government to “conspicuously identif[y]” any government-
produced programming.182 This bill would have set forth clear, specific 
attribution requirements. For television programs (e.g., VNRs), the bill 
would have required the federal agency to display “PRODUCED BY THE 
 
174 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
175 See Jeffrey Peabody, When the Flock Ignores the Shepherd—Corralling the Undisclosed Use of 
Video News Releases, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 579 (2008). 
176 Id. at 581. 
177 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2012). 
178 Id. Some have argued that this constitutes an in-kind contribution and thus should be attributed. 
Peabody, supra note 175, at 593. Controversial or political messages are always subject to a disclosure 
requirement. Goodman, supra note 168, at 97–98. However, given that most State Department and 
BBG programming is apolitical news, it is unlikely that this material would be either controversial or 
political. See, e.g., VOICE OF AMERICA, supra note 119. 
179 Bejesky, supra note 14, at 991. 
180 The federal government produced and distributed hundreds of VNRs in support of invading Iraq 
in the months leading up to the conflict. See id. at 990–92; Peabody, supra note 175, at 581–82. 
181 S. 967, 109th Cong. (as introduced by Senate, Apr. 28, 2005). 
182 Id.  
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U.S. GOVERNMENT” onscreen for the program’s entire duration;183 for 
radio programs, the bill would have required the federal agency to “audibly 
inform” the audience that the program was produced by the federal 
government.184 And, in order to prevent third-party tampering, the bill 
would have made it illegal for “any person” to remove the government 
attribution.185 This legislation, by virtue of its simplicity, specificity, and 
comprehensiveness, would have made it nearly impossible for any federal 
agency—including the State Department and the BBG—to air unattributed 
programming within the United States. 
Unfortunately, the Truth in Broadcasting Act was never passed. Before 
it could go to a vote, the bill was completely rewritten. The revised Truth in 
Broadcasting Act, renamed the “Prepackaged News Story Announcement 
Act of 2005,” was a watered-down version of the original. In its edited 
form, the bill vaguely required federal agencies to provide “clear 
notification” that a program was prepared by the federal government.186 
And, unlike the original Truth in Broadcasting Act, the Prepackaged News 
Story Announcement Act did not make it unlawful to remove the 
attribution from the broadcast, instead delegating the determination of 
noncompliance to the Federal Communications Commission.187 So 
ineffectual was the revised version of the legislation that one commentator 
called it a “toothless hound” in comparison to the “watchdog” version that 
preceded it.188 Even though this insipid version of the Truth in Broadcasting 
Act may have been introduced to gain bipartisan support, it failed to do 
so—the bill died in Congress.189 
Exhuming the original text of the Truth in Broadcasting Act would 
provide a much-needed check on the broad powers afforded to the State 
Department and the BBG under the 2013 Amendment. For the legislation 
to be effective, however, it must adopt the Truth in Broadcasting Act’s 
requirement for explicit attribution of government-produced materials and 
its strict anti-tampering penalties for third parties.190 But to be truly 
effective, this legislation must go beyond the text of the Truth in 




185 Id.  
186 Prepackaged News Story Announcement Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. § 2 (as reported by 
Senate, Dec. 20, 2005). 
187 Id. 
188 Peabody, supra note 175, at 587. 
189 S. 967 (109th): Prepackaged News Story Announcement Act of 2005, GOVTRACK, https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s967 [http://perma.cc/4RNF-M267].  
190 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Attribution requirements for campaign finance 
reform may also serve as a viable template. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2012). 
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violation by a federal agency. Additionally, this legislation must require 
independent oversight to verify that federal agencies are properly 
attributing their programming. With these precautions in place, the risk of a 
federal agency circumventing the law would be diminished significantly. 
Passing attribution legislation in the same vein as the Truth in 
Broadcasting Act of 2005 would preserve the benefits of the 2013 
Amendment while minimizing its drawbacks. It would allow the State 
Department and the BBG to legally broadcast its message within the United 
States and promote the 2013 Amendment’s goal of greater government 
transparency. But most importantly, effective attribution legislation would 
assuage any concerns of the State Department and the BBG 
“propagandizing” the American people.191 Admittedly, requiring attribution 
may render government-produced programming less credible to its target 
audience (i.e., those communities susceptible to anti-American 
propaganda) because it would clearly flag when the government is voicing 
its message. However, it is also possible that government programming 
presented in an honest, transparent fashion would foster trust with its 
viewership. 
C. Revisiting Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n 
The State Department and the BBG may also be compelled to attribute 
any of their materials disseminated within the United States under the 
government speech doctrine.192 This legal doctrine is in its nascent stages, 
and its application to government-produced programming is uncertain.193 
Nonetheless, it is an attractive route for requiring attribution because it 
does not require the broad political support necessary to pass the effective, 
but potentially controversial, attribution legislation described above. 
In essence, the government speech doctrine protects the government 
from First Amendment challenges.194 The government can selectively fund 
a program to encourage activities that promote the public interest without 
being required to also fund alternative programs that address the problem in 
other ways.195 In so doing, the government is deemed not to have 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; rather, “it has merely chosen to 
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”196 In practical terms, 
individuals cannot challenge government speech under the Free Speech 
 
191 See Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 627 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
192 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578–80 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
193 Id. at 574 (“The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly 
imprecise.”). 
194 See Mia Guizzetti Hayes, Comment, First Amendment Values at Serious Risk: The Government 
Speech Doctrine After Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 802 (2006). 
195 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). 
196 Id. 
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Clause because it conflicts with their private viewpoints.197 This “glaring 
exception to the First Amendment” allows the government to insert its 
viewpoint in public discourse, without the need to also give a voice to those 
groups with which it disagrees.198 Simply put, under this doctrine, the 
government need not be “viewpoint neutral.”199 
But not all speech emanating from the government is government 
speech. Speech is only considered government speech when the 
government communicates a message directly to the public, or 
alternatively, when it uses private speakers to transmit specific information 
pertaining to a government program.200 In this latter scenario, the private 
actor is “essentially an organ of the government” so it is “constructively the 
government that is speaking,” even though the message is disseminated by 
a nongovernmental entity.201 However, the government is barred from 
inserting government speech into certain public forums,202 such as in streets 
and parks,203 public university funding of student publications,204 and 
political elections.205 These are considered areas where the government is 
deemed to be selecting a message, rather than voicing a message;206 
whereas the former is considered unconstitutional because the government 
is regulating private viewpoints, the latter is considered constitutional 
because the government is simply advancing its viewpoint.207 It is a tenuous 
distinction, and one that is often difficult to discern in practice.208 
The government speech doctrine permits the State Department and the 
BBG to disseminate their viewpoints within the United States without 
violating the Constitution. When the State Department and the BBG speak 
through a private entity (e.g., by transmitting VOA programming through a 
private television or radio station), that speech is protected under the 
government speech doctrine because it is transmitted directly through an 
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198 Leading Case, Government Speech Doctrine—Compelled Support for Agricultural Advertising, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 277, 283–84 (2005).  
199 Id. at 283. 
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117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2416 (2004).  
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203 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
204 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. 
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organ of the government209 and because it does not take place in one of the 
public forums that require viewpoint neutrality.210 Therefore, the State 
Department and the BBG need not be concerned about presenting 
viewpoint-neutral programming, and may selectively choose to cover some 
stories over others.211 
However, it is less clear whether the State Department and the BBG 
need to attribute their message under the government speech doctrine. 
Between 2000 and 2001, the Supreme Court held in Board of Regents of 
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth and in Legal Services Corp. 
v. Velazquez that the government generally must be accountable to the 
electorate when it speaks.212 However, just a few years after these rulings, 
the Court refined its stance in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n.213 In 
this case, two beef producing associations brought action against the United 
States Department of Agriculture and sought injunctive relief with respect 
to the generic advertising funded by targeted assessment on cattle sales and 
importation.214 The advertisements promulgated by the government were 
attributed to “America’s Beef Producers” without any explicit mention of 
the government’s support or involvement.215 The claimants argued that the 
government was improperly concealing its role in funding the campaign.216 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that given the particular facts 
of the case, the government was not obligated to clearly attribute its 
involvement because the constitutionality of the advertisements did not rest 
upon “whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as 
the government’s.”217 Although the Court stopped short of permitting the 
government to broadcast its message without attribution in all situations, it 
indicated that, at least in certain circumstances, the government need not 
identify itself when communicating with the public. 
In his dissent, Justice Souter vehemently disagreed with the majority’s 
stance that the American people need not always know when the 
 
209 For example, when a television station is broadcasting information created solely by the 
government, it may be considered an organ of the government.  
210 See supra notes 202–05. 
211 Leading Case, supra note 198 at 283–84 (“Government speech is a glaring exception to the First 
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government selected the message, not upon whether the government voices it.”). 
212 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000). 
213 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
214 Id. at 555–56. 
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government is speaking.218 To protect the public’s First Amendment rights, 
Justice Souter argued that “the political process [must serve] as a check on 
what government chooses to say.”219 When the public does not know if the 
government is speaking, they are ignorant of the government’s position, 
meaning that the government can engage in any speech—however 
controversial—without fear of electoral repercussions.220 Therefore, Justice 
Souter argued, the public must always know when the government is 
speaking221—an opinion not unlike that held by those who supported the 
passage of the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005.222 
Johanns served only to further muddy the waters for an already 
unclear issue about whether government-produced materials should be 
properly attributed. Interestingly, the reasoning espoused in Justice 
Souter’s dissent has gained traction in a number of federal circuits. In the 
2006 Sixth Circuit case American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. 
Bredesen, the court interpreted the majority’s opinion in Johanns narrowly, 
advancing the position that if speech is controlled by the government, the 
government must attribute its involvement.223 Later, the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed Bredesen in Kidwell v. City of Union.224 In the Kidwell dissent, 
Judge Boyce Martin, Jr. went even further than the majority in affirming 
Bredesen, arguing that government speech should be attributed in order “to 
prevent confusion and subliminal governmental propaganda in the 
marketplace of ideas.”225 The Ninth Circuit has also suggested that 
attribution may be required under the government speech doctrine, stating 
that “an attribution claim might form the basis for an as-applied First 
Amendment challenge” to government speech.226 The majority of circuits 
have yet to address this issue post-Johanns, which leaves open the 
possibility that other circuit courts will join the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in 
 
218 Justice Souter was joined in his dissent by Justices Kennedy and Stevens. Id. at 570 (Souter, J. 
dissenting). 
219 Id. at 575; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 
(2000) (“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a 
particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy.”). 
220 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577–79 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
221 See id. at 575. 
222 See S. REP. NO. 109-210, at 1 (2005). 
223 441 F.3d 370, 375, 377 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit also found that even if the 
government does not attribute its speech, it may nonetheless constitute government speech. Id.  
224 See 462 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the government determines an overarching 
message and retains power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the message must be 
attributed to the government for First Amendment purposes.” (quoting Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375)). 
225 Id. at 627 n.1 (Martin, J., dissenting); id. (“[T]he government, when it speaks, ought to be 
required to make clear that it is in fact the government that is speaking.”). 
226 Charter v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 412 F.3d 1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). 
109:511 (2015) Apple Pie Propaganda? 
545 
support of Justice Souter’s belief that government speech should be 
attributed. 
The trajectory of the government speech doctrine indicates that a 
judicially imposed attribution requirement for government-produced 
programming may be on the horizon. The Southworth and Velazquez 
opinions, Justice Souter’s dissent in Johanns, and the recent opinions of the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits constitute a growing body of law supporting 
attribution when the government speaks. This is an encouraging 
development. If the American people cannot reasonably identify when the 
government is speaking to them, it makes sense that the government should 
be compelled to attribute the source. Otherwise, the American people will 
have no knowledge of the government’s actions and thus no compulsion to 
push back, potentially affording the government “enormous power” over 
public discourse.227 Whether a judicially imposed attribution requirement 
will take hold, however, is far from certain given the volatility of the 
government speech doctrine in recent years.228 
CONCLUSION 
The domestic dissemination ban in the Smith–Mundt Act is rooted in 
the Cold War. As with other vestiges of that era that have succumbed to 
technological and social modernity, so, too, has the domestic dissemination 
ban. The 2013 Amendment now allows the State Department and the BBG 
to better combat domestic terrorism, and also promotes greater government 
transparency. However, the 2013 Amendment creates new problems. Now, 
there is little preventing the State Department and the BBG from widely 
disseminating unattributed government-produced programming within the 
United States. 
The danger of domestic dissemination does not lie in the dissemination 
itself; rather, it lies in anonymous dissemination. To curb the potential harm 
of covert government propaganda, there must be either legislation or a 
judicial doctrine that requires the State Department and the BBG to 
attribute their materials. The Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005 provides an 
excellent template for a future bill that would require attribution on 
government-produced programming. Similarly, a judicially imposed 
attribution requirement under the government speech doctrine may also 
solve the problem. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ acceptance of Justice 
Souter’s reasoning in the Johanns dissent indicate that a judicially imposed 
attribution of government-produced programming may be forthcoming.  
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Fortunately, there is little evidence that the State Department and the 
BBG have any desire to “propagandize” the American people.229 But the 
best rules are ones that are enacted before they are needed. It is critical to 
establish safeguards now—before the United States enters into a new 
conflict or engages in some other highly controversial activity—that will 
prevent the federal government from covertly influencing public opinion 
within the United States. The government will continue to speak, and the 
American people must know to whom they are listening. 
 
229 See Josh Rogin, Much Ado About State Department ‘Propaganda,’ FOREIGN POL’Y (May 23, 
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